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IMPACT OF NON-RUSSIAN ETHNIC GROUPS ON THE SOVIET MILITARY.(U)
APR 82 J A PATTISON

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
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IMPACT OF NON-RUSSIAN ETHNIC GROUPS ON THE SOVIET MILITARY

by

COL John A. Pattison

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
INTRODUCTION

An interesting trend is emerging in the Soviet Union: The Russians are destined to become a minority group within their own vast empire. This fact, confirmed by the last census figures taken in 1979, is causing considerable concern in the Kremlin due to the impact on the economic structure and the military.

Most Americans tend to use the terms Soviet Union and Russia interchangeably, a misimpression that I will examine in terms of the nationalistic ethnic groupings that within the next decade will outnumber the Great Russians. Of particular concern, and the focus of this paper, is the effect that the increasing numbers of non-Russians will have on the Soviet military and, consequently, Soviet policy.

In order to fully comprehend the changes occurring in the ethnodemographic situation in the Soviet Union, it will be helpful to review some basic geography and history of the region. The USSR is comprised of 15 constituent republics with the names of the republics generally reflecting the predominant ethnic group residing within it. The map of the Soviet Union (Figure 1) depicts the geographical disposition of the constituent republics and thus the area of residence of the principal ethnic groups. One notes immediately that the area is dominated by the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, the RSFSR, which stretches from the Eastern bloc satellite nations to the Pacific Ocean and from the Arctic Ocean to China and Mongolia on the southern flank. Surrounding the RSFSR, and forming the Soviet Union's


Figure 1



frontiers with Europe, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and portions of China are the other 14 republics. In the northwest are the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian Soviet Socialist republics, generally referred to as the Baltic republics. The Belorussian and Ukrainian nationalities are Slavic in origin and are grouped with the Great Russians. The Moldavians are considered distinct from the Slavs due to their similarities with their neighbors to the west, the Romanians. In the southwest are the Transcaucasian republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, bordering on Turkey and Iran. The Central Asian republics consist of the Turkmen, Uzbek, Tadzhik, Kirgiz, and Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republics, the predominantly Muslim republics which form borders with the remainder of Iran, Afghanistan and northwestern China.

The Soviet Union is comprised of more than 100 different ethnic strains speaking approximately 70 separate languages. (Figure 2). The Tsarist armies of Imperial Russia conquered and annexed the non-Russian republics by the 20th century and until the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 maintained absolute domination of the various nationalities despite their many attempts to assert national rights and achieve autonomy. Following World War I, several groups gained independence and ethnic unrest spread into Central Asia. This potential loss of sources of grain, oil, minerals, and cotton was intolerable to the Bolshevik regime and they set about regaining territories and suppressing separatist tendencies by political and military means. Essentially, the political fate of every national area was settled by force of arms.¹ Lenin realized that force would not be effective in

Figure 2



entirely eradicating nationalism so adopted the policy of gradually establishing the constituent republics and granting them a degree of cultural and linguistic autonomy, plus the theoretical right to secede from the Soviet Union. The 1930's, under Stalin's collectivization and purges, bore heavily on the non-Russians and was characterized by Kremlin fears of minority disloyalty. In fact, during World War II, several hundred thousand non-Russians defected to the Germans and fought against the USSR, resulting in Stalin deporting entire groups of minority elements to the Eastern republics. The Ukrainians and Muslim nationalities bore the brunt of Stalin's purges and deportations.² Although the post-World War II period saw a consolidation of control over the national elements, the Kremlin continues to voice concern over the nationalities problem, particularly in light of the current ethnodemographic trends.

SOVIET DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

The most recent censuses taken by the Soviet Union occurred in 1959, 1970, and 1979. For reasons not entirely clear, very little information has been officially released by the Soviets concerning the 1979 census even though three years have elapsed since the collection of the data. Despite a plethora of information on demographics up through the 1970 census, I found only two excellent sources and analyses of demographics which included 1979 data. I have consequently relied heavily on these two sources for my material in this section. The first source is Mr. Murray Feshbach, Senior Research Scholar at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics and Professional Lecturer, Department of Demography, Georgetown University. Specifically I used his article, Between the Lines of the 1979 Soviet Census,³ plus personal discussion with him. Second source is Mr. Edmund Brunner, Jr. of Rand Corporation and his Rand Note, Soviet Demographic Trends and the Ethnic Composition of Draft Age Males, 1980-1995.⁴

Following his study of 1979 Census data, Mr. Feshbach concludes that important changes are occurring within the Soviet Union in four general interrelated categories: (1) differential rates of population growth among different national groups; (2) failure of the male population of the USSR, particularly in predominantly Slavic areas, to regain its demographically normal share of total population in the postwar period; (3) uneven geographic distribution of the youngest population cohorts (those aged 0 to 9 years); and (4) an "aging" of the overall population. Following a basic examination of census data and the

trends they portray, I will discuss further the 0-9 population cohort.

Table 1 shows the breakdown in the Soviet Union among Russians and non-Russians. It depicts by republic the total population, the ethnic nationals residing in their own republics, and non-Russians residing in republics other than their own.⁵ One notes that the RSFSR has more people than the other republics combined with a total of 138 million of the Soviet Union's 262 million population. Next in rank are the Ukraine, Uzbek, Kazakh, and Belorussian republics. Approximately 24 million ethnic Russians live outside the RSFSR and only in the Transcaucasus has their absolute strength declined in the past 9 years. Note that 41 million non-Russians also live in republics other than their own, of whom about 24 million live in the RSFSR. However, it is important to realize that 21 of the 41 million do not have republics corresponding to their nationality, ie, the Tatars, Poles, Jews, Germans and a host of other ethnic groups.

The composition of the population and the trends between 1959 and 1979 are clarified in Table 2.⁶ The data are grouped by geographic area showing numbers of people (indigenous Nominal Ethnic Group, Russians, and others) in each, their average annual rates of increase, the percentages represented by each of these three classes of people within their own area, and as a share of the total Soviet population. It is interesting that the overall rates of population growth fell from 1959 to 1979 for the Soviet Union as a whole and for each of the geographic areas. The growth rate of ethnic Russians was only 60 percent of the non-Russians during the period 1970-1979 meaning that the Russians are not

Table 1

POPULATION OF THE USSR, RUSSIANS AND OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS, 1959-1979
(Millions of People)

	Total Population			Indigenous Nominal Ethnic Groups Nationals in Own Republic			Russians in These Republics			Other Ethnic Groups in These Republics		
	1959	1970	1979	1959	1970	1979	1959	1970	1979	1959	1970	1979
Republic												
Slavic												
Russian (RSFSR)	127.53	130.08	137.55	97.86	107.75	113.52	(97.86)	(107.75)	(113.52)	19.67	22.33	24.03
Ukraine	41.87	47.12	49.76	32.16	35.28	36.49	7.09	9.13	10.47	2.62	2.71	2.80
Belarusian	8.06	9.00	9.56	6.53	7.29	7.57	0.66	0.94	1.13	0.87	0.77	0.86
Subtotal	167.46	186.20	196.89	136.55	150.32	157.58	105.61	117.82	125.12	23.16	25.81	27.69
Baltic												
Lithuanian	2.71	3.13	3.40	2.15	2.51	2.71	0.23	0.27	0.30	0.33	0.35	0.39
Latvian	2.09	2.36	2.52	1.30	1.34	1.34	0.56	0.70	0.82	0.23	0.32	0.36
Estonian	1.20	1.76	1.47	0.89	0.93	0.95	0.24	0.34	0.41	0.07	0.09	0.11
Subtotal	6.00	6.85	7.39	4.34	4.78	5.00	1.03	1.31	1.53	0.63	0.76	0.86
Transcaucasus												
Azerbaijani	3.70	5.12	6.03	2.49	3.78	4.71	0.50	0.51	0.48	0.71	0.83	0.84
Armenian	1.76	2.49	3.03	1.55	2.21	2.73	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.14	0.21	0.23
Georgian	4.04	4.69	5.01	2.60	3.13	3.43	0.41	0.40	0.37	1.03	1.16	1.21
Subtotal	9.50	12.30	14.07	6.64	9.12	10.87	0.98	0.98	0.92	1.88	2.20	2.28
Central Asia												
Uzbek	8.26	11.80	15.79	5.04	7.73	10.57	1.11	1.47	1.67	2.11	2.60	3.15
Kazakh	9.15	13.01	14.68	2.72	4.16	5.29	3.95	5.52	5.99	2.48	3.31	3.40
Tajik	1.98	2.90	3.80	1.05	1.63	2.24	0.26	0.34	0.40	0.67	0.93	1.16
Turkmenian	1.52	2.16	2.76	0.92	1.42	1.89	0.26	0.31	0.35	0.34	0.43	0.52
Kirgiz	2.07	2.93	3.53	0.84	1.29	1.69	0.62	0.86	0.91	0.61	0.78	0.93
Subtotal	22.98	32.80	40.16	10.57	16.23	21.68	6.20	8.50	9.32	6.21	8.07	9.16
Moldavia												
	2.89	3.57	3.95	1.89	2.30	2.53	0.29	0.41	0.51	0.71	0.86	0.91
Repopulation												
RSFSR	117.53	130.08	137.55	97.86	107.75	113.52	97.86	107.75	113.52	19.67	22.33	24.03
All other Republics	91.30	111.64	124.89	62.13	75.00	84.14	16.25	21.27	23.88	12.92	15.37	16.87
USSR	208.83	241.72	262.44	159.99	182.75	197.66	114.11	129.02	137.40	32.59	37.70	40.90
USSR (double counting of Russian eliminated)	208.83	241.72	262.44	159.99	182.75	197.66	16.25	21.27	23.88	32.59	37.70	40.90

SOURCES: Soviet Censuses of 1959, 1970 and 1979.

Items may not add to totals due to rounding.

Line items of next to last row yield incorrect totals for USSR due to double-counting of Russians (a) as the nominal ethnic group in its own republic (RSFSR) and (b) as Russians in all republics. Last row line items add to correct totals for the USSR by elimination of the double-counting.

Table 2

NUMBERS OF PEOPLE BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA, GROWTH RATES, AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION, 1959-1979

Geographic Area	Millions of People			Annual % Increase		Percent within Group			Percent of USSR		
	1959	1970	1979	1959-1970	1970-1979	1959	1970	1979	1959	1970	1979
USSR	117.53	130.08	137.55	0.93	0.62	100.00	100.00	100.00	56.27	53.81	52.41
Russians	97.86	107.75	113.52	0.88	0.58	83.26	82.83	82.53	46.86	44.58	43.26
Others	19.67	22.33	24.03	1.16	0.82	16.74	17.17	17.47	9.42	9.24	9.16
Ukraine + Belarussia	49.93	56.12	59.32	1.07	0.62	100.00	100.00	100.00	23.91	23.22	22.60
Russians	38.69	42.57	44.06	0.87	0.38	77.49	75.86	74.28	18.53	17.62	16.78
Others	7.75	10.07	11.60	2.41	1.58	15.52	17.94	19.55	3.72	4.17	4.42
Baltic Republics	3.49	3.48	3.66	-0.01	0.56	6.99	6.20	6.17	1.67	1.44	1.40
Russians	6.00	6.85	7.39	1.21	0.85	100.00	100.00	100.00	2.87	2.81	2.72
Others	4.34	4.78	5.00	0.88	0.50	72.33	69.78	67.66	2.08	1.98	1.90
Transcaucasian Republics	1.03	1.31	1.53	2.21	1.74	17.17	19.12	20.70	0.49	0.54	0.58
Russians	0.63	0.76	0.86	1.72	1.38	10.50	11.10	11.64	0.30	0.31	0.33
Others	9.50	12.30	14.07	2.78	1.51	100.00	100.00	100.00	4.54	5.09	5.36
Central Asian Republics	6.64	9.12	10.87	2.93	1.96	69.89	74.15	77.26	3.18	3.77	4.14
Russians	0.98	0.98	0.92	0.00	-0.70	10.32	7.97	6.54	0.47	0.41	0.35
Others	1.88	2.20	2.28	1.44	0.40	19.79	17.89	16.20	0.90	0.91	0.87
Georgian Republic	22.98	32.90	40.16	3.29	2.28	100.00	100.00	100.00	11.00	13.57	15.30
Russians	10.57	16.23	21.68	3.98	3.26	45.00	49.48	53.98	5.06	6.71	8.26
Others	6.20	8.50	9.32	2.91	1.03	26.98	25.91	23.21	2.97	3.52	3.55
Moldavia	6.21	8.07	9.16	2.41	1.42	27.02	24.60	22.81	2.97	3.34	3.49
Russians	2.89	3.37	3.95	1.94	1.11	100.00	100.00	100.00	1.38	1.48	1.51
Others	1.89	2.30	2.53	1.80	1.06	65.40	64.43	64.05	0.91	0.95	0.96
Non-Russian	0.29	0.41	0.51	3.20	2.45	10.03	11.48	12.91	0.14	0.17	0.19
Others	0.71	0.86	0.91	1.76	0.53	24.57	24.09	23.04	0.34	0.36	0.35
USSR	208.81	241.72	262.44	1.34	0.92	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Russians	159.59	182.75	197.64	1.22	0.88	76.61	75.60	73.32			
Others	97.86	107.75	113.52	0.88	0.58	46.86	44.58	43.26	Same as previous three columns on the left		
Non-Russian	62.13	75.00	84.14	1.73	1.29	29.75	31.02	32.06			
Others	48.84	58.97	64.78	1.73	1.05	23.39	24.40	24.68			
Non-Russian	16.25	21.27	23.88	2.48	1.29	7.78	8.80	9.10			
Non-Russian not in USSR	32.59	37.70	40.90	1.33	0.91	15.61	15.60	15.58			
All Russians	114.11	129.02	137.40	1.12	0.70	100.00	100.00	100.00	54.64	53.38	52.35
In USSR	97.86	107.75	113.52	0.88	0.58	83.26	82.83	82.53	46.86	44.58	43.26
Others	16.25	21.27	23.88	2.48	1.29	14.24	16.5	17.18	7.78	8.80	9.10
All Non-Russians	94.72	112.70	125.04	1.59	1.16	100.00	100.00	100.00	45.36	46.62	47.65
In USSR	62.13	75.00	84.14	1.73	1.29	65.60	66.50	67.29	29.75	31.03	32.06
Others	32.59	37.70	40.90	1.33	0.91	34.40	33.50	32.71	15.61	15.59	15.58

* Russian Indigenous Ethnic Group.

reproducing as rapidly as the non-Russians. Since Russians now comprise about 52 percent of the population, they will number less than the non-Russian ethnic groups if present trends continue. Emigration of Russians outside their own republic is depicted by the fact that Russians in the 14 republics outside the RSFSR increased more than twice as fast as those in the RSFSR.

The highest growth rates, by far, were exhibited by the peoples of Central Asia. From 1970-79 the ethnic groups of Central Asia grew at a rate 3.1 times the national rate. The peoples of the Transcaucasus also grew faster than the national rate while the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belorussian, and Baltic republics were below the national growth rate. The following overall trends emerge. Russians are losing in relative strength in their own republic, in the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, and in the USSR as a whole but have gained relatively in the Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia, and Baltic republics.⁷ Table 3 contains data on the numbers of people in the major ethnic groups irrespective of their location within the Soviet Union.⁸ Muslim Turkic peoples, wherever situated, are growing in numbers faster than any other nationality (2.6 times the national rate from 1970-79). Their percentage of the Soviet total increased from 12 percent in 1959 to 17.4 percent in 1979. Concurrently the Slavs (including the Russians) fell from 76 percent to 72 percent. Another interesting trend is that ethnic groups having their own constituent republic, except the Slavs, tend increasingly to live within their boundaries, showing a resistance to movement within the USSR. The Russians living inside their republic, however, decreased from 85.7 percent in 1959 to 83.3 percent in 1979, a reflection of

Table 3

SOVIET POPULATION BY MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS, 1959-1979

Ethnic Group	Millions of People			Annual % Increase		Ratio to National Percent of Increase		Percent of Total Population		
	1959	1970	1979	1959-1970	1970-1979	1959-1970	1970-1979	1959	1970	1979
Baltic People										
Estonians	0.99	1.01	1.02	0.02	0.01	0.11	0.46	2.40	2.11	2.02
Lithuanians	1.40	1.41	1.44	0.01	0.03	0.14	0.09	0.67	0.59	0.55
Latvians	2.31	2.67	2.85	1.25	0.71	0.93	0.79	1.11	1.10	1.09
Slavic People										
Russians	159.27	178.82	189.21	1.06	0.67	0.79	0.67	76.27	71.98	72.10
Ukrainians	114.11	129.02	137.60	1.12	0.70	0.86	0.76	54.66	51.18	52.35
Belarusians	7.91	9.05	9.46	1.21	0.49	0.92	0.53	1.79	1.74	1.61
Ukrainians	37.25	40.75	42.15	0.82	0.43	0.61	0.47	17.84	15.86	16.14
Muslim-Turkic People										
Azerbaijans	26.21	27.02	28.22	1.19	2.17	2.18	2.58	12.55	15.12	17.42
Azerbaijans	0.08	0.10	0.11	2.05	1.06	1.51	1.15	0.06	0.06	0.06
Azerbaijans	2.94	4.18	5.48	3.69	2.52	2.75	2.74	1.41	1.81	2.09
Ingush	0.99	1.24	1.17	2.07	1.11	1.54	1.21	0.47	0.51	0.52
Chechens	0.42	0.61	0.76	3.45	2.47	2.57	2.68	0.20	0.25	0.29
Dagestanis	1.67	1.69	1.75	1.28	0.19	0.96	0.42	0.70	0.70	0.47
Ingush	0.67	1.12	1.17	4.78	2.76	3.57	2.46	0.12	0.46	0.52
Ingush	0.12	0.16	0.17	2.65	0.68	1.98	0.74	0.06	0.07	0.06
Ingush	0.11	0.16	0.19	3.46	1.91	2.58	2.10	0.05	0.07	0.07
Ingush	0.20	0.28	0.12	3.11	1.49	2.12	1.62	0.10	0.12	0.12
Ingush	0.17	0.24	0.10	3.18	2.51	2.17	2.73	0.08	0.10	0.11
Ingush	0.08	0.11	0.11	2.94	1.87	2.19	2.03	0.04	0.05	0.05
Ingush	3.62	5.30	6.56	3.51	2.40	2.63	2.61	1.73	2.19	2.50
Ingush	0.97	1.45	1.91	3.72	1.11	2.78	1.18	0.46	0.60	0.71
Ingush	0.16	0.19	0.23	7.82	2.15	2.10	2.34	0.07	0.08	0.09
Ingush	0.06	0.09	0.11	1.75	4.17	2.80	4.53	0.01	0.04	0.05
Ingush	1.40	2.14	2.90	3.91	3.43	2.93	3.73	0.67	0.88	1.11
Ingush	4.97	5.93	6.12	1.62	0.71	1.21	0.77	2.18	2.45	2.51
Ingush	1.00	1.51	2.01	3.00	1.11	2.90	1.11	0.41	0.61	0.77
Ingush	6.02	9.20	12.46	3.91	3.43	2.93	3.73	2.88	3.80	4.75
Ingush	0.78	1.10	1.23	1.17	1.25	2.17	1.36	0.37	0.46	0.47
All Other People										
Armenians	28.63	20.77	22.20	0.99	0.74	0.74	0.80	8.92	8.60	8.46
Armenians	2.79	3.56	4.15	2.74	1.72	1.67	1.86	1.11	1.47	1.58
Georgians	2.69	1.24	1.57	1.71	1.08	1.28	1.17	1.29	1.14	1.16
Georgians	1.62	1.85	1.94	1.71	0.51	0.90	0.58	0.76	0.76	0.76
Georgians	4.26	2.15	1.81	-0.45	-1.89	-0.16	-2.05	1.08	0.89	0.69
Georgians	2.21	2.70	2.97	1.84	1.06	1.17	1.15	1.06	1.12	1.11
Georgians	1.28	1.26	1.19	-0.16	-0.61	-0.10	-0.68	0.61	0.52	0.45
Georgians	1.56	1.17	1.15	-0.19	-0.19	-1.11	-0.71	0.66	0.68	0.64
Georgians	4.40	6.84	5.62	0.87	1.26	0.65	1.16	2.11	2.00	2.06
Others	208.83	241.72	262.64	1.34	0.92	1.00	1.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

migration from the RSFSR to the Baltics and Central Asia.

Since the focus of this paper is on the ethnic impact to the military I will now extract figures projected by Brunner's study of 18 year old males (draft age) for the years 1985, 1990, and 1995. The results of his mathematical regression, based on current population trends is shown in Table 4.⁹ The following facts of interest emerge from this projection:

1. Ethnic Russians now appear to comprise less than half the 18 year old male cohort and by 1995 will comprise about 46 percent of the total.

2. The percentage of ethnic Russians and their fellow Slavs taken together will fall from about 67 percent of the cohort in 1980 to about 62 percent in 1995.

3. Muslim-Turkic peoples comprise the only group for which the percentages of 18 year old males in the Soviet total will increase - from about 23.5 percent in 1980 to about 28.7 percent in 1995.

4. The Muslim-Turkic group is also the only one which will gain in its share of the total population of the Soviet Union in this period.

5. The numbers of 18 year old males will reach a nadir of about 2.15 million in 1985 but will increase thereafter to about 2.32 million in 1995.

Another indicator of the changing demographics of draft age Soviets in the next decade is found in the analysis conducted by Mr. Feshbach. As noted earlier, he found that there was an uneven distribution of the youngest population cohorts, those aged 0-9 years, who will provide the potential draft pool for the Soviets in future years.¹⁰ Table 5 shows the trends in the share of the 0-9 population by republic and Table 6 depicts the percentage change. It is clear that there is a sharp

Table 4

DISTRIBUTION OF ETHNIC GROUPS WITH OUR REPUBLICS, 1959-1970
(Millions of People)

	Total in USSR			In Our Republics			Elsewhere			Percent at date			Percent elsewhere		
	1959	1970	1979	1959	1970	1979	1959	1970	1979	1959	1970	1979	1959	1970	1979
Baltic People	4.72	5.11	5.31	4.34	4.78	5.00	0.38	0.33	0.31	92.0	93.5	94.2	8.0	6.5	5.8
Estonians	0.99	1.01	1.02	0.89	0.93	0.95	0.10	0.08	0.07	89.9	92.1	93.1	11.1	7.9	6.9
Latvians	1.40	1.43	1.44	1.30	1.34	1.34	0.10	0.09	0.10	92.9	93.7	93.1	7.1	6.3	6.9
Lithuanians	2.33	2.67	2.85	2.15	2.51	2.71	0.18	0.16	0.14	92.3	94.0	95.1	7.7	6.0	4.9
Slavic People	159.27	178.82	189.21	156.55	150.30	157.58	22.72	28.50	31.63	85.7	84.1	83.3	14.3	15.9	16.7
Russians	114.11	129.02	137.40	97.86	107.75	113.52	16.25	21.27	23.88	85.8	83.5	82.6	14.2	16.5	17.4
Belarusians	7.91	9.05	9.46	6.53	7.29	7.57	1.38	1.76	1.89	82.6	80.6	80.0	17.4	19.4	20.0
Ukrainians	37.25	40.75	42.35	32.16	35.28	36.49	5.09	5.47	5.86	86.3	86.6	86.2	13.7	13.3	13.8
Transcaucasians	8.42	11.18	13.20	6.64	9.12	10.87	1.78	2.06	2.33	78.9	81.6	82.4	21.1	18.4	17.6
Armenians	2.94	4.38	5.48	2.49	3.78	4.71	0.45	0.60	0.77	84.7	86.3	85.9	15.3	13.7	14.1
Georgians	2.79	3.56	4.15	1.55	2.21	2.73	1.24	1.35	1.42	79.2	82.1	85.8	20.8	17.9	14.2
Georgians	2.69	3.24	3.57	2.60	3.13	3.43	0.09	0.11	0.14	96.7	96.6	96.1	3.3	3.4	3.9
Central Asians	13.01	19.61	23.86	10.57	16.23	21.68	2.44	3.38	4.18	81.2	82.8	83.8	18.8	17.2	16.2
Uzbeks	6.02	9.70	12.46	5.04	7.73	10.57	0.98	1.47	1.89	83.7	84.0	84.8	16.3	16.0	15.2
Kazakhs	3.62	5.30	6.56	2.72	4.16	5.29	0.90	1.14	1.27	75.1	78.5	80.6	24.9	21.5	19.4
Tajiks	1.40	2.14	2.90	1.05	1.61	2.24	0.35	0.51	0.66	75.0	76.2	77.2	25.0	23.8	22.8
Turkmen	1.00	1.52	2.03	0.92	1.42	1.89	0.08	0.10	0.14	92.0	91.4	93.1	18.0	6.6	6.9
Kirgiz	0.97	1.45	1.91	0.84	1.29	1.69	0.13	0.16	0.22	86.6	89.0	88.5	13.4	11.0	11.5
Moldavians	2.21	2.70	2.97	1.89	2.30	2.53	0.32	0.40	0.44	85.5	85.2	85.2	14.5	14.8	14.8
Subtotal	187.63	217.42	236.55	159.99	182.75	197.66	27.64	34.67	38.89	85.3	84.0	83.6	14.7	16.0	16.4
People Without Republics	21.20	24.30	25.89	0	0	0	21.20	24.30	25.89	0	0	0	100.0	100.0	100.0
USSR	208.83	241.72	262.44	159.99	182.75	197.66	48.84	58.97	64.78						

**Table 5 Trends in Share of USSR Population
Aged 0 to 9 Years, by Republic, 1959, 1970,
and 1979**

	(in percent)		
	1959	1970	1979
"Slavic" republics:			
RSFSR	21.92	16.36	14.80
Ukraine	18.85	15.98	14.22
Belorussia	21.95	18.37	14.75
Moldavia	25.78	20.56	17.72
Baltic republics:			
Estonia	15.81	14.61	14.14
Latvia	15.09	14.75	13.62
Lithuania	18.68	18.02	15.90
Transcaucasus:			
Armenia	29.02	25.76	20.74
Azerbaijdzhan	29.36	30.39	23.16
Georgia	21.48	20.18	17.36
Kazakhstan	27.81	25.25	22.93
Central Asia:			
Kirgiziya	29.48	28.78	25.29
Tadzhikistan	30.75	33.51	30.29
Turkmenistan	30.36	31.89	29.04
Uzbekistan	30.19	31.77	29.19
USSR	22.20	18.61	16.81

SOURCES: For 1959 and 1970, TsSU SSSR, *Razv. Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda* (Results of the 1970 All-Union Census), Vol. 2, Moscow, Statistika, 1972, pp. 12-73. For 1979, Table 2 above.

**Table 6 Population Aged 0 to 9 Years,
by Republic, 1959-79**

	1959 (thou- sands)	1970 (thou- sands)	1979 (thou- sands)	Change, 1959-79 (percent)
"Slavic" republics:				
RSFSR	25,768	21,286	20,340	-21.06
Ukraine	7,890	7,533	7,065	-10.58
Belorussia	1,768	1,654	1,406	-20.48
Moldavia	744	734	700	-5.91
Baltic republics:				
Estonia	189	198	207	9.52
Latvia	316	337	341	7.91
Lithuania	507	564	539	6.31
Transcaucasus:				
Armenia	812	642	630	23.06
Azerbaijdzhan	1,086	1,595	1,396	28.55
Georgia	869	946	867	-2.30
Kazakhstan	2,585	3,285	3,367	30.25
Central Asia:				
Kirgiziya	609	844	891	46.31
Tadzhikistan	609	972	1,163	89.33
Turkmenistan	460	688	803	74.57
Uzbekistan	2,451	3,748	4,492	83.27
USSR	46,362	44,986	44,066	-4.97

SOURCE: For 1959 and 1970, TsSU SSSR, *Razv. Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda* (Results of the 1970 All-Union Census), Vol. 2, Moscow, Statistika, 1972, pp. 12-73. For 1979, Table 2 above.

variance by republic with this cohort comprising 14-16 percent of the population in the Slavic and Baltic republics and 29-30 percent of the population in three of the Central Asian republics. Of even greater significance is the trend shown in Table 6 depicting significant decreases in the Slavic republics and huge increases in the Central Asia republics. This shows clearly that there will be an increased proportion of non-Russians comprising the draft pool, and therefore the Soviet Military forces, in the next decade.

NON-MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

Before discussing the military implications of the ethnodemographic trends evident in the Soviet Union, I believe it necessary to briefly mention several of the non-military factors emanating from the population changes. Probably the foremost trend is that of increasing nationalism among the non-Russian groups. Historically, the Russians have occupied the preponderance of positions of power in the Soviet Union. With few exceptions, members of the Politburo have been Great Russians and these are the individuals who have shaped the destiny of the nation. Although, theoretically all Soviet nationalities are equal, The Russians have certainly been "first among equals", or "big brothers" to the other ethnic groupings. This has caused historic nationality problems and with the increase in non-Russians, these problems are likely to intensify. Some of the recent examples include the renunciation of Soviet citizenship and demand to be repatriated by various diaspora nationalities, the Jews, Volga Germans, and others; the emergence of outspoken critics of official nationality policies and practices and the failure of the government to stifle such criticism despite thousands of arrests; nationalistically inspired acts of violence, such as the two day riot in Kaunas, Lithuania in 1972; an extremely rapid increase in the membership of republic and local ethnographic societies; and numerous recent cases where party and state officials have shown laxity in combating forces of local nationalism, e.g. Ukraine and Georgia.¹¹ This increase in nationalism is likely to be particularly pronounced in the Central Asian nationalities as they become drawn increasingly into the mainstream of the country's economic development. Conversely, the European

nationalities may become increasingly restive if they are subjected to an onslaught of Central Asian workers or the mass movement of economic resources to speed the industrialization of Central Asia. Also, increasing education and communications will make it more difficult for the regime to isolate the masses from dissident nationalist spokesmen within and outside the USSR. The central government may be forced to make difficult decisions concerning increased repression (Stalinization) or granting increased individual and nationalistic freedom. Further exacerbating this situation is the gloomy economic situation characterized by low production of consumer goods and inadequate agricultural production.

The Soviet economy also will be severely affected by the changing demographics of the nation. By the late 1980's, the number of Europeans reaching working age will actually decline from the present average of about 4 million per year to slightly over 2 million. This will force a higher proportion of low skilled non-Russian workers during a period of increasing technological complexity. Further complicating this dilemma is the fact that the preponderance of heavy industry is located in the area of least population growth so Soviet leadership is faced with two difficult choices: move the industrial centers to the Central Asian republics or try to induce the Central Asian workers to migrate outside their traditional homelands, a choice they have shown extreme reluctance to adopt in the past. Large family size will serve as a real constraint on migration to cities in general and overcrowded European cities in particular.¹² The prospect of choosing between

unpalatable alternatives is most likely to result in Soviet leadership, Brezhnev or his successor, continuing the current practice of "muddling through", thus portending continued decline in industrial growth rates.

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

Article 63 of the 1977 USSR Constitution states that military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR is the sacred obligation of Soviet citizens. The 1967 law on universal military service states:

All male citizens of the USSR, regardless of race or national identity, religion, education, residence, social or property status are obligated to perform active service in the ranks of the Armed Forces.

This continues the Soviet tradition of universal service for males, a policy dating back to shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution. The 1967 law established a standard draft age (18) and two call-ups during the year, one in April-June and the second October-December. Conscripts serve in one of the seven principal components of the Armed Forces: Ground, Navy, Air, Air Defense, Strategic Rocket Forces, Border Guards, and Internal Troops. Their length of service is dependent on assignment, either two or three years normally; however, conscripts with college degrees serve for 18 months or two years, depending on their branch of service. The law also provides for deferments for family hardship and non-correctable health problems. Following their tour of active duty, soldiers are discharged into the reserves where they are subject to periodic refresher courses. It appears that between 65 and 75 percent of the 18 year old pool is drafted, with an additional 5-10 percent coming from the 21-26 year old cohort.¹³ The Armed Forces, aside from their principal role of providing national security, are charged with several domestic

functions, including:¹⁴

- * providing a mobile labor force for seasonal or high priority government projects.
- * serving as a source of vocational and technical training that transfers to the civilian economy following military service.
- * providing an intensive program of political socialization for large numbers of males during the transition to adulthood.
- * creating a Russian language environment which is seen as an important impetus to bilingualism, as well as a source of interethnic contact which is advantageous to the assimilation of non-Russian minorities.

It is clear, then, that one of the principal functions of the Armed Forces is as a tool for integration. A basic tenet of troop assignment is "extraterritoriality", or assigning forces outside their home areas. Only briefly, toward the end of World War II was this policy changed to permit national or republic forces. Once the war ended, these units disappeared and the Soviet Armed Forces became multinational, i.e., theoretically composed of equally diverse nationalities. The Russian language is the sole language used by the military, therefore all conscripts need a basic understanding of Russian.¹⁵ Thus, universal military service has the goal of fusing recruits from various nationalities into mixed units and serving as a cultural melting pot by the constant use of the Russian language. Speaking at the fiftieth anniversary of the federation in 1972, Soviet Premier stated,

"Our army is a special one. It is a school for internationalism, instilling sentiments of fraternity, solidarity and mutual respect for all the nations and na-

ationalities of the Soviet Union. Our armed forces form a single family, the living embodiment of socialist internationalism".

Despite this goal, questions arise concerning the relationship between intentions and reality. As we shall see in later pages, there are indications that this social integration and harmony are less than ideal. The national problem shows up most vividly in the selection of military leaders.¹⁶ Little data is published on the ethnocultural composition of the officer corps, however scattered information provides an indication of the disproportionately high number of Slavs in this elite group. It is generally acknowledged that approximately 95 percent of the officer corps is Slavic, with the vast majority of these Russians. Whether the Army is an efficient tool for socialization is also an open question. It appears that those who come from a barely Russified background do not seem to emerge from the military service any more Russified. Perhaps, on the contrary, by living in a purely Russian background they become more aware of the forces of integration at work, of the distance between theory (a multi-national army) and reality (a Russian army) and draw from this one more argument for their deep attachment to national values.¹⁷ It is apparent that Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, First Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff, is concerned with the problems of assimilation and lack of familiarity with the Russian language exhibited by non-Russian conscripts. In his book, Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland, he wrote:¹⁸

Considering the question of preparing youth for military

service, one especially ought to point out the importance to them of a good knowledge of the Russian language. Regrettably, a number of young people still come into the army today with a weak knowledge of the Russian language, which seriously hinders their military training. In the Armed forces, as is known, all regulations, instructions, training aids, technical and weapons manuals are in the Russian language. Orders, directives, and commands are also rendered in the Russian language. It is completely understandable, that if young people have a weak grasp of the Russian language, then it will be more difficult to master weapons and technology entrusted to them, coordination of crews, teams will take place much more slowly, and all this in some degree will impact negatively on the level of combat readiness of subunits.

Dr. Ellen Jones of the Defense Intelligence Agency has analyzed the quantity and quality of the future Soviet conscript.¹⁹ She concurs with earlier cited sources that the manpower pool will decline to near, but not below, the two million mark in the mid-1980's and that the composition of the force will be increasingly non-Russian. She states that the percentage of Muslim nationalities in the draft-age pool will increase from 9.6 percent in 1970 to approximately 19.8 percent in 1985. She feels that, despite this change in composition, the Soviet military will not be seriously affected. She counters the argument of some authorities who state that the non-Russians will be less educated by her argument that the education of many non-Russian younger age groups

exceeds that of the ethnic Russians. Also, she estimates that 80-85 percent of the current draft age males throughout the Soviet Union are fluent in Russian.²⁰ Another area of concern is the possibility of widespread interethnic tension. Dr. Jones believes that Soviet educators and political officers are sufficiently alert to this problem and that such difficulties will be minimal. The reliability of non-Russian conscripts is also addressed by Dr. Jones. After a careful examination of conscription, stationing, and assignment policies, she does not believe that there are any separate rules for different nationalities based on apprehension over their reliability; therefore, non-Russians are not restricted to menial tasks or nonsensitive posts.²¹ In summary, she believes that the problems associated with absorbing an increased proportion of non-Russians in the Armed Forces are expected to remain within manageable proportions.

Opposing the view of Dr. Jones is a study entitled, The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces: Preliminary Findings, by S. Enders Wimbush and Alex Alexiev of Rand Corporation.²² The information in this study was drawn exclusively from in-depth interviews with former Soviet servicemen and was intended to display trend-lines concerning the influx of non-Russians in the Soviet military. The initial report is based on a sample size of some 40 interviews, each lasting an average of 2-3 hours and addressing the following issues:

Recruitment, stationing and personnel practices.

Pre-induction and in-service training and education.

Language use.

Control and discipline.

Inter-ethnic relations.

Weapons use and technological adaptation.

Force effectiveness.

I will extract from this report the key conclusions and trends impacting on those areas of concern to this paper.

Military Recruitment. The most important induction and recruitment functions are accomplished by a network of military commissariats (voenkomats), which are staffed by predominantly Russian officers regardless of the geographic location. These officers decide which service or branch a given recruit will serve. Almost all interviewees are convinced that there are specific instructions governing the conscription of non-Russians. In one specific case, a junior officer claimed to know of a regulation limiting to five percent the share of non-Russians in the Soviet Air Force. The actual distribution of recruits and a desirable ethnic balance in particular units are achieved through a system of "buyers" from given military districts, thus matching demand and supply. As would be expected, bribery among the voenkomat, buyers, and individual recruits is widespread and affects the distribution of ethnic nationalities.

Stationing Guidelines and Practices. The basic principle of stationing was confirmed to be extraterritoriality, i.e., the stationing of conscripts in geographically distant and ethnically different areas of the country. All respondents felt that the national divisions of World War II were disbanded because of ethnic unrest and suspected political disloyalty - such units presented a very real danger to Soviet control in peripheral areas. Many respondents believed that there is

a conscientious policy to choose specific nationalities who are known to be traditionally antagonistic to the ethnic population in the area in which they serve. In general, troops are isolated from the native populations in the areas in which they are stationed to avoid ethnic conflict.

Ethnic Composition of Conscripts, NCO's and the Officer Corps. Non-Slavic conscripts constitute approximately 20 percent of combat units, although they are usually relegated to serving in support capacities. Non-Slavs make up as much as 80 percent of the construction forces, and Central Asians are heavily over-represented in these units. High technology services, such as the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Air Force, are manned largely by Slavs - approximately 90-95 percent, of whom the large majority are Russian. Internal Security Forces (MVD) are reported to contain a significant percentage of Central Asians, who serve as prison camp guards and general policing roles. Non-commissioned officer ranks are filled primarily by Slavs, with Eastern Ukrainians constituting a sizable share, perhaps as high as 60 percent. Interviewees agree that Eastern Ukrainians resemble a permanent non-commissioned officer corps. The Soviet officer corps is overwhelmingly Slavic, approximately 95 percent, of whom Russians are a strong majority. Current training and promotion policies discriminate against non-Slavs for attaining officer rank.

Education and Training. Pre-induction training for non-Slavs is limited. Interviewees were able to identify no in-service Russian language courses for non-Russians. Central Asians serving in construction

battalions receive little or no military training of any kind.

Construction troop recruits, a majority of whom are non-Slavic minorities, remain civilians in uniform in terms of their military skills. Two obvious conclusions are: first, a majority of the non-Slavs seemingly receive little or no military training before or during their service; and second, perhaps as much as 20 percent of the Soviet Armed Forces are unarmed.

Language. Russian is the language of command. All written and verbal instruction is in Russian, non-Russian literature is discouraged, and punishment is approved for those who cannot or will not learn Russian. Interviewees agree that the use of non-Russian languages cannot be controlled out of formation and that it is widespread. After approximately one year of service, non-Russian speaking conscripts acquire the ability to function at a basic level in Russian - "kitchen Russian" - but dissimulation is widespread and hard to control. Fluency in Russian is required in the high technology services, which limits the number of non-Slavs who can qualify for these duties.

Inter-Ethnic Relations. Inter-ethnic relations in the Armed Forces are characterized by the isolation of Slavs and non-Slavs into their ethnic groups, intense racial discrimination against Central Asians, and other dark-skinned non-Slavs, and observable ethnic self-assertiveness. Interviewees agree that, contrary to Soviet accounts, ethnic awareness is heightened, not reduced in a close-quarter military environment. The conflict level between Slavs and Central Asians and other Turkic or Muslim servicemen is pronounced, often resulting in armed clashes of various intensity. Officers avoid intervening in inter-ethnic conflict.

Contrary to the Slav vs non-Slav ethnic conflict, interviewees could recall few indications or incidents of ethnic dissent or violence directed by non-Russians at other non-Russians.

The trends in this report suggest interesting short and long term force effectiveness and combat-related problems for the Soviet Armed Forces. Areas of concern include the reliability of the support force; basic training shortcomings, inadequate individual training, and unit training weaknesses; constrained introduction and mastering of modern technology; potential limitations on force size; internal security dilemmas; and the potential for large-scale defections, ethnic or racial riots, and conflict between the armed forces and regional populations.

The actual impact of the increasingly non-Russian nationalities on the Soviet Armed Forces probably lies somewhere between the theoretical "non-problem" voiced by Dr. Ellen Jones and the potential for considerable difficulty indicated by the interviewees in the Wimbush/Alexiev study.

A recent example of the use of non-Russian soldiers in a force projection scenario was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979. Central Asian forces were used in the initial elements moved into Afghanistan and their use may provide some insight into the actual difficulty, if any, with the use of non-Russian combat forces. A study, again by Wimbush and Alexiev, entitled, Soviet Central Asian Soldiers in Afghanistan²³ prepared by Rand Corporation for the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, in January 1981 provides the best information available on this subject. The study

concludes that many Soviet Central Asians served in Afghanistan, but in non-combat roles and that, with few exceptions, these troops were never intended to engage the Afghan rebels except incidentally. The great majority were assigned to construction, support, and occupation units that were highly visible to foreign correspondents and diplomats, who may have been unable to distinguish between combat and construction troops and between soldiers of different nationalities who are racially similar. In addition, the authors believe that some of the Soviet Central Asian soldiers in Afghanistan belong to Soviet Internal Security Forces (MVD) and to special airborne units which, according to earlier research, contain Central Asians. While Central Asian troops probably were not intended to engage in combat with the Afghan rebels, Soviet leaders may have believed that the ethnic affinities between Soviet Central Asian troops and the Afghan population would blunt the political impact of the violent invasion. This public relations effort appears to have failed; Soviet Central Asian troops reportedly engaged in widespread fraternization with the Afghan peoples. Primarily for this reason, Central Asians were replaced by Slavic troops beginning in late February 1980. Some recent information from Soviet Central Asia indicates that the use of the ethnic nationalities has caused a new awareness among Soviet Central Asians concerning their relationship to the populations across their border, and in particular, to the world of Islam. Soviet leaders undoubtedly will learn many lessons from this experience, including the difficulties they are likely to encounter if they are required again to mobilize incomplete divisions from local,

non-Slavic reservists. Increasingly, as the pool of available conscripts, and hence future reservists, becomes more and more non-Russian, this issue will play a major role in mobilization decisions. Moreover, the reassessment concerning the use of Soviet Central Asians in a future power projection role is likely to ensure that the long-standing historical doubts about the reliability of Central Asian participation in the Soviet Armed Forces will resurface and be strengthened.²⁴

CONCLUSIONS

The preponderance of information on the subject of the ethnic impact on the Soviet military indicates that Soviet leaders face a significant problem and that changes must be made to assimilate smoothly the changing components of the Armed Forces. There will be impact on training, discipline, force levels, ability to use high technology, leadership positions, and force/power projection. I do not believe that the Soviet military is going to collapse from within or even suffer severe degradation of their combat capability. I do believe, however, that we will witness certain changes relative to the incorporation of increasing numbers of non-Russians in the military. Some of these changes may be:

- Reduction in the total size of the Armed Forces, and of those portions primarily composed of Slavic personnel.
- Temporary reduction of deferments of Slavs and increase in the deferments of Central Asians.
- Introduction of more weapon and support systems with labor saving characteristics.
- Increased use of non-Slavs in military positions currently reserved for Slavs.
- Use of military construction units on civilian projects, thus releasing Slavic construction workers for the armed forces.
- Extension of the term of service in all branches of the military from the current two years to three years (as in the Navy).
- Economic reform to increase labor productivity, thus reducing labor requirements.

- Selective changes in unit manning levels.
- Changes in the career/conscript and the civilian/military mix within the Armed Forces.
- Increased reluctance to mobilize Category 2 or 3 divisions with ethnic reserve forces for future commitment along border areas inside or outside the Soviet Union.
- An increased role for non-Russians in leadership roles and in combat units.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The changes described in this paper are somewhat subtle but warrant increased vigilance by U.S. policymakers. The power projection capability of the Soviet Armed Forces could be degraded over the next decade, thus increasing the concern of Soviet leaders in situations that could result in a military confrontation with the U.S. At the very least, there will be situations ripe for exploitation by U.S. or allied propaganda agencies or covert action. These opportunities must be seized when presented in order to foment continued unrest and problems as Kremlin leaders muddle through in their efforts to resolve the negative impact that the influx of non-Russians will have on the combat capability of the Soviet Armed Forces.

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